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VIEWPOINT 
 
On the complexity of ethical claims related to shale gas policy 
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Introduction  (Main text = 4,099 words) 
In a recent article in Local Environment, Matthew Cotton (2016) lays out a foundation for 
what an ethical approach to decision making on policy and planning in relation to shale gas 
development could look like.  This is the most comprehensive attempt in peer-reviewed 
academic literature to characterise and explicate the requirements and constraints on 
ethically-justified policy in relation to this contentious extractive industry.  Cotton (2016) 
uses Shrader-Frechette’s (2002) Principle of Prima Facie Political Equality (PPFPE) to 
critique policy and planning decisions in the UK in relation to shale gas development.  The 
PPFPE focuses heavily on distributive and procedural justice and gives particular attention to 
the need for: equitable compensation for any harms sustained, access to information about 
potential harms, and ability to participate freely in decision making processes (Cotton 2016). 
 Cotton’s (2016) articulation of an ethical framework by which to evaluate the fairness 
and appropriateness of policy on shale gas development is a major step in the right direction.  
Evensen (2015, 2016a) has asserted that an explicit account of the circumstances under which 
development would or would not be ethically justified is perhaps the biggest gap in the policy 
discourse and debates on this issue.  Indeed, there have been numerous public claims about 
the ethicality of ‘fracking’ (shale gas development), but until Cotton’s (2016) foray into this 
area, the academic literature on the topic was quite limited (Evensen 2016a).  A few prior 
articles had highlighted distributive justice issues related to fracking (Cotton 2013, Evensen 
2015, Fry et al. 2015, Hardy and Kelsey 2015, Hays and de Melo-Martín 2014, Hotaling 
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2013, Malin 2014, Measham et al. 2016, Willow and Wylie 2014), procedural justice 
considerations (Cotton 2013, de Wit 2011, Evensen 2015, Finkel et al. 2013, Fry et al. 2015), 
and/or the role of precautionary thinking in ethical approaches to evaluating unconventional 
gas development (de Melo-Martín et al. 2015, Finkel and Hays 2013, Law et al. 2014). 
 Cotton’s (2016) article draws together the range of distributive and procedural justice 
considerations; as such, it is one of the most important social scientific or humanistic articles 
written to date on this much-debated form of energy development.  It offers a solid point of 
departure for ethical thought on shale gas policy; nevertheless, there is more work to be done.  
Following Cotton’s analysis, aspects of the PPFPE arise as problematic or require additional 
clarification, including: the role of compensation in distributive justice, the definition of a 
‘community’, the need for information provision, and the best way to ensure procedural 
justice.  Two overarching issues that merit attention in relation to ethical thought on shale gas 
policy, but that were not addressed by Cotton (2016), are: (1) the role of shale gas 
development as just one means of energy extraction in a larger energy system – development 
does not occur in a vacuum – and (2) the role of virtue in determining ethicality of shale gas 
policies.  I speak to these two issues and the four areas of Cotton’s argumentation requiring 
additional attention below. 
 
Revisiting the ethical arguments made to date 
Because Cotton (2016) is the scholar to have most comprehensively attempted an account of 
what is demanded from ethically-justified policy on shale gas development, I use his 
arguments as a point of departure.  This article should not be read as an attack on or 
repudiation of his analysis, but rather as an attempt to carry the conversation further by 
exploring some of the concepts in greater detail.   
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Compensation 
Cotton (2016, p. 4) asserts that the PPFPE, and by extension ethical policy, demands that 
‘unequal treatment must therefore be compensated for (primarily through economic means of 
wealth redistribution or increased community economic opportunity)’.  Based upon this 
principle, he concludes that the UK Government’s current proposed policies for community 
compensation ‘go some way towards fulfilling’ the PPFPE requirement, but that ‘distributive 
injustices may still occur’ (pp. 7-8).  Whilst any policy, no matter how carefully crafted, 
could still leave open some possibility for distributive injustices, it is worth noting that two of 
the three peer-reviewed distributive justice analyses of shale gas development in print have 
offered little evidence of injustice (Clough and Bell 2016, Ogneva-Himmelberger and Huang 
2015).   
In examining development in Pennsylvania, Clough and Bell (2016, p. 1) revealed, 
‘no evidence of traditional distributive environmental injustice: there is not a disproportionate 
number of minority or low-income residents in areas near to unconventional [shale gas] 
wells’.  They did, however, reveal that people living close to well sites ‘are not enjoying 
substantial economic benefits from shale gas development’ (Clough and Bell 2016, p. 7); 
nevertheless, they do not explore whether the economic benefits are enough to compensate 
for the harms sustained.  Ogneva-Himmelberger and Huang (2015, p. 171), in their 
assessment of distributive injustice in three US states (Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West 
Virginia) reported, ‘Our analysis shows that environmental injustice was observed only in 
Pennsylvania…results for West Virginia and Ohio did not show any evidence of 
environmental injustice with respect to the five socio-demographic characteristics of 
population.’  The injustice revealed in Pennsylvania was that drilling occurred more 
frequently in poor areas, but no bias in drilling distribution in that state was observed based 
on variations in education, race, or age. 
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Fry et al. (2015), in the third study to analyse distributive justice in relation to shale 
gas, reveal that much of the financial benefit of development within a city in Texas accrues to 
residents living outside of the city itself, due to split estate mineral rights – where different 
parties own the surface and subsurface rights.  Again, however, there is no explicit analysis of 
whether compensation received in the community is adequate to compensate for the 
environmental and health risks sustained within the community – ‘noise and light pollution, 
and report[ed] nosebleeds, nausea, headaches and other symptoms’ (Fry et al. 2015, p. 99).   
A strict equality stance would deem one party benefiting more than another to be 
‘injustice’.  Nevertheless, it would seem to violate common sense morality, and Rawls’ 
(2005, 2009) oft cited conceptions of distributive justice, to deny one party benefits simply 
because another party benefits less.  What matters far more is whether one party is harmed, 
and not compensated adequately, whilst another benefits.  None of the three distributive 
justice analyses show this to be the case.  Cotton (2016, p. 7) acknowledges that distributive 
injustices would likely be more prevalent in the US than the UK due to the ‘split estate 
mineral regimes’ cited by Fry et al., which do not exist in the UK due to mineral rights being 
vested to the Crown.  This, combined with the incipient evidence from the US, leads one to 
further question the potential for distributive injustice related to shale gas development in the 
UK. 
 Cotton also compares the amount of compensation offered to communities, through 
the United Kingdom Onshore Operations Group’s (UKOOG) voluntary charter to the royalty 
payments received by mineral rights owners in the US – with the royalty payments being 
substantially larger (at least for solidly productive wells that have been able to reclaim 
operating costs).  This comparison is problematic for two reasons, however.  First, since 
publication of Cotton’s article, HM Treasury (2016) in the UK has conducted a consultation 
on its proposed ‘Shale Wealth Fund’ (Whitton et al. 2017).  This mechanism would allocate a 
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portion of the tax collected on shale gas development to the ‘local communities’ affected by 
development; the definition of what constitutes a ‘local community’ has not yet been 
finalised.  This addresses concerns about the industry-provided compensation being subject to 
a voluntary charter; those voluntary payments, however, would not be affected by the 
government fund.   
Second, the absolute amount of compensation received should be irrelevant for 
decisions on the ethicality of shale gas policy.  What is relevant is whether any unequal 
effects (burdens) of development are compensated for adequately (see Jacquet 2014 for an 
overview of social impacts).  To my knowledge, no one yet has attempted to systematically 
calculate the level of appropriate compensation.  Note – this does not mean that current shale 
gas policy is ethically sound, but it means that such analysis is required before determining 
ethicality of policy.  Social impacts are of such varied forms, from road damage to traffic 
congestion to strained emergency services to increases in crime and drug use to fluctuating 
house and rental prices to psycho-social stress, that any such calculation would necessarily be 
quite complex and involve a large suite of variables.  Alternatively, one could assess the 
social, environmental, and economic effects of shale gas development in areas where 
development has occurred and gauge whether compensation has allowed for mitigation of 
negative impacts in these cases.  Whilst numerous case studies exist (e.g., Malin 2014, Perry 
2012, Willow et al. 2014), these often explicitly focus on areas where impacts have been felt 
and remain unmitigated.   
Before one could claim that compensation policy fosters or ameliorates distributive 
injustices, he/she would need a more complete understanding of the extent to which negative 
impacts of shale gas development have remained unmitigated, after accounting for 
compensation to individuals and communities.  Furthermore, a comparison of compensation 
afforded in actual cases where injustice is claimed to have occurred, compared to 
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compensation guaranteed under the policy being considered (e.g., UK policy), would be 
useful for assessing the potential of the policy to foster injustice. 
Finally, a few challenges to the premise that adequate compensation helps ensure an 
ethical policy could be levelled.  First, one might make the case that monetary compensation 
is incommensurate to the types of harm sustained by shale gas development.  For example, 
empirical research has pointed to changes in place identity and place attachment as a key 
effect of shale gas development (Brasier et al. 2011, Fernando and Cooley 2016, Jacquet 
2014, Jacquet and Stedman 2013, 2014, Jerolmack and Berman 2016, Kroepsch 2016, 
Morrone et al. 2015, Perry 2012, Sangaramoorthy et al. 2016, Schafft and Biddle 2015).  
Whilst financial recompense can reasonably mitigate the effects of strained emergency 
services and degraded road quality, it is unclear that money can do much to re-instil lost place 
identity or place meaning, or fully remedy negative environmental or human health 
outcomes, should they occur.  Therefore, if the role of compensation is mitigation of negative 
burdens that disproportionally accrue, it might not actually be able to achieve this purpose.  A 
potential area for future ethical reflection and analysis could be whether alternative, non-
financial forms of compensation (e.g., direct provision of services connected to community 
well-being) could address the problem of compensation not adequately mitigating negative 
burdens of development. 
Second, one might question the goal of compensation – is it simply to ease 
inequalities?  As Rawls (2005, 2009) outlines in his ‘difference principle’, equality of 
liberties and equality of opportunity do not necessitate compensation or equal compensation.  
The worst off should not be disadvantaged in an absolute sense, but if this criterion is met and 
the condition of the worst off is actually improved in an absolute sense, a policy producing 
additional inequalities might not be objectionable.  Of course, others would disagree with 
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Rawls’s perspective, but here I merely draw attention to additional complexity inherent in 
ethical claims about compensation. 
 
Definition of a ‘community’ 
Connected to the concept of compensation is identification of the entity that receives that 
compensation – in the case of UK policy, this is the ‘local community’ (HM Treasury 2016).  
HM Treasury’s consultation on the Shale Wealth Fund explicitly deals with the challenge of 
how to define a ‘community’ for the purposes of providing compensation.  Cotton (2016, p. 
8) alleges, ‘injustices may occur when a community is defined by spatial proximity’ and goes 
on to recommend that clear guidelines and mandates govern how compensation to 
communities can be spent.  I do not question the possibility for spatially-defined communities 
(e.g., municipalities, councils) to cause some people to benefit more than others, but it is 
unclear to me why this would foster more injustices than other approaches to community 
definition.  Again, the relevant ethical question should not be if someone benefits more than 
someone else, but if someone is materially harmed by the extractive development and those 
harms are not adequately mitigated through appropriate compensation.  Of course, one could 
remedy the problem of unequal compensation by simply doing away with compensation (or 
shale gas development) entirely, but that seems ethically inappropriate unless there is a good 
reason to believe that harms will occur that cannot be mitigated. 
The Shale Wealth Fund consultation (HM Treasury 2016) proposes compensation 
being allocated on ‘local’ and ‘regional’ levels.  If an adequate portion of the funding is 
apportioned to the regional level, this would allow for greater flexibility in addressing and 
mitigating any adverse impacts that do arise.  Cotton’s critique seems to be based in the 
legitimate concern that environmental, economic, and social impacts of development are not 
tied to political boundaries of local councils (the municipal level in Britain).  Regional 
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funding to address impacts, however, could be targeted where it is most needed.  Whilst I 
agree with Cotton that some guidelines and mandates would be helpful for ensuring that 
compensation benefits those affected most by development, it must be acknowledged that the 
more restrictions imposed on how communities can spend their compensation, the less 
autonomy they have.  Mandates on how communities allocate compensation directly conflicts 
with recommendations under PPFPE of local residents’ participatory involvement in decision 
making; it could engender worse outcomes by ignoring local nuances. 
 
Information access and procedural justice 
Cotton thoroughly reviews the extent to which shale gas policy in the UK has adequate 
provisions for local residents to contribute meaningfully to the policy process, and to offer 
informed and autonomous consent for development.  His summary evaluation is that ‘in 
relation to public participation and consent it is clear that powers are being taken away from 
local communities’ (Cotton 2016, p. 14).  In addition to the evidence in his article, this is 
further brought to light by the recent decision of the UK communities secretary, Sajid Javid, 
to overturn Lancashire County Council’s denial of planning applications for Cuadrilla to 
develop sites in that county.  I fully agree with Cotton that procedural justice demands 
opportunities for meaningful two-way engagement and locals’ ability to influence decision 
making.  I define ‘procedural justice’ here in line with John Rawls’s conception of ‘perfect 
procedural justice’, which is characterized by established criteria for what constitutes a 
fair/just outcome and procedures that ensure the fair outcome will materialise (Rawls 2009).  
What remains unclear to me is why procedural justice demands that local communities retain 
ultimate authority to authorise development. 
 The ethical necessity of access to information (asserted by the PPFPE) conflicts, at 
least in part, with the commitment to local level decision making.  In the rural communities 
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of North America, where I have studied shale gas development for most of the last decade, 
informational and planning resources are extremely limited.  Of course, government can work 
diligently to increase access to information, but many of the decision makers in small 
municipalities are volunteers or receive minimal stipends; even if information is readily 
available, the time they have to digest it is restricted and inadequate.  I am not advocating for 
solely national level decision making, but merely drawing attention to potential conflicts that 
arise when seeking informed decisions alongside local participation in decision making.  
Intermediate levels exist between the local community and the national level.  In the US, 
Canada, and Australia, unconventional gas development is regulated predominantly at the 
state/provincial level.  In the UK, authority over shale gas decisions has already been 
devolved, de facto or de jure, to Scotland and Wales.  Therefore, the UK policy on shale gas 
only applies to England.  England is large and diverse, but just because the final decision on 
planning applications is not made at the local level does not mean that the public could not be 
afforded different means for engaging in the decision-making process.  The procedural justice 
requirement is more about ensuring meaningful engagement than vesting final authority for 
approval with local government.  
 Beyond the issues of information access and level of regulation, the principle of 
autonomous consent, taken at face value, seems to imply some unpalatable consequences.  In 
New York State, a moratorium on shale gas development existed from 2008-2014, following 
which this temporary hold became a permanent ban.  During the moratorium, several 
communities passed legislation stating their support and desire for shale gas development to 
be allowed in their communities.  Would autonomous consent over-rule New York’s (or 
France’s, or Quebec’s) ban on shale gas development if a community sought development?  
This could lead to problems because many of the impacts would be regionally felt, and not 
just within a specific community.  For example, many impacts of regional industrial 
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development – good and bad – of shale gas development in Pennsylvania (where there is 
much development) have been felt in southern NY (with a ban), due to workers and traffic 
flowing across the border. 
 If ethical policy on shale gas truly required autonomous consent in the strict sense, 
and if autonomous consent means that the local community has ultimate authority, then 
national (and state/provincial) prohibitions on development would be disallowed, or would 
simply be quickly over-ruled.  This in itself is not a problem, but it seems inconsistent with 
the end result that many who advocate for local control desire, and it could lead to a host of 
other ethical dilemmas due to regionally-felt impacts.  A conversation about ethical 
differences between protection from harm and welfare enhancement could shed further light 
on the instances in which autonomous consent may or may not be an appropriate goal. 
 
Additional ethical arguments to consider 
Whole energy system 
Perhaps the primary consideration absent from Cotton’s (2016) enumeration of ethical 
principles relevant to shale gas policy is that shale gas is not regulated in a vacuum.  Energy 
(and natural gas specifically) is still being used in the UK (and everywhere else); that energy 
will come from somewhere.  It is fine to point out, as Cotton does, that most shale gas 
resources exist in regions with previous fossil fuel extraction legacies (e.g., coal), which 
means that people previously exposed to the ills of extractive industry might be asked to bear 
further consequences of extraction.  This does point to injustice, but a full ethical analysis 
cannot stop there.  If that development does not occur, what energy development would occur 
in its stead?  Would those same coal resources be tapped further?  If so, would the potential 
harms to environment and health be less, more, or similar?  If not domestic energy sources, 
would the UK import more liquefied natural gas from Qatar?  If so, under what conditions 
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was that gas extracted?  What harms and/or injustices were experienced in that nation?  I am 
not saying that any of this analysis necessitates policy that goes ‘all out for shale’ in the north 
of England, but these additional questions do require reflection. 
 A further energy system consideration, on the national level, is the extent to which 
investments in natural gas domestically within any given nation postpone or retard focus on 
renewable energy generation (Evensen 2016b, Gilbert and Sovacool 2014).  If a 
government’s support for unconventional gas concomitantly reduces incentives for truly low-
carbon technologies, the effects of exacerbating global climate change and delaying work to 
mitigate climate change must be incorporated into a full consequentialist analysis.  
 Bringing the systems view to the issue of compensation, Cotton (2016, p. 9) states, 
‘An ethically acceptable fracking community payback scheme under the PPFPE must 
therefore ensure political safeguards for communities suffering multiple indicators of socio-
economic deprivation’.  This seems quite reasonable to achieve the stated goal of preventing 
economic coercion into accepting development.  Nevertheless, one is left asking to what 
extent such provisions exist for other forms of energy development.  I am not seeking to 
descend into the fallacy that just because one injustice is allowed, others are permitted as 
well.  I am trying to point out that energy development will occur whether shale gas 
development does or not.  From a consequentialist perspective, it is ethically relevant to 
consider what injustices will occur in the energy development that takes place in the absence 
of shale gas development in the UK, if policy prohibits or restricts development.  If an 
injustice relates both to shale gas policy and policy on other forms of development, it is 
incumbent upon us researchers to explicitly note that the ethical critique really has little to do 
with shale gas and much more to do with energy governance and regulation writ large. 
 Reflection on the whole energy system again becomes necessary when Cotton (2016, 
p. 10) declares that ‘notably absent is the opportunity for locally affected communities to 
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question the “need case” for fracking activities, and thus [they] cannot actively provide or 
withhold informed consent’.  How is this different from procedures for other forms of energy 
development?  For onshore wind development in the UK, there is more community capacity 
to regulate development.  (Somewhat ironically many of the same groups who decry UK 
shale gas policy because it limits local decision making also oppose the policy that allows 
communities to regulate wind development.  This is presumably because the wind policy was 
ostensibly designed to allow for opposition to wind farms, whilst the shale gas policy was 
designed to prevent effective opposition to development.)  Cotton (2016, p. 10) directly links 
the lack of adequate public engagement on shale gas development to ‘other energy-related 
projects’ when he acknowledges that many engagement processes do not allow for 
deliberative mechanisms or provision of community consent.  Let me be clear, poor 
procedural (or distributive) justice for one type of energy development in no way justifies 
poor procedural justice elsewhere, but it does require us to give extra attention when 
evaluating the full consequences of shale gas policy – energy development will still occur and 
the injustices invoked by that development merit similar attention. 
 
Virtue 
It is far beyond the scope of this brief article to delve into an entire branch of ethical thinking 
in depth, but I do wish to at least draw attention to a way of considering the ethically of shale 
gas policy in addition to the distributive justice and procedural justice angles introduced by 
Cotton (2016).  Hurka (2001) defines virtue as an intrinsic good that can be treated as any 
other intrinsic good worthy of promotion and pursuit under consequentialist thinking.  One 
might object to shale gas policy if it fails to ensure one’s capacity to live virtuously.  Whilst 
virtuous living is not simple to characterise, a case could be made that seeking to protect or 
foster community character and place identity is a virtuous act (Hurka 2006).  Cotton (2016, 
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p. 12) just briefly touches on the possibility that shale gas policy might inhibit upon this 
virtuous act when he writes that the UK approach ‘recognises and prioritises certain place 
identities over others’; the wealth of studies pointing to effects on place identity and place 
attachment further this contention (see section on compensation above).  Therefore, one way 
of assessing the ethicality of shale gas policy would be to consider the effect it has on local 
residents’ capacity to live and act virtuously, in addition to the effects that the policy could 
have on material well-being. 
 
Conclusion 
Cotton’s (2016) initial attempt to lay out an ethical framework for assessing the ethicality of 
policy on shale gas development is an extremely important contribution to the academic 
literature on this form of extractive development.  Public claims about the moral character of 
shale gas development have abounded for some time; yet, the absence of a concerted 
exploration of what exactly characterises such development as ethical or not has made such 
claims little more than individual opinions and has severely limited their usefulness in policy 
conversations on this contentious issue (Evensen 2016a).  Cotton’s analysis helps to rectify 
this tendency.   
I have attempted to continue the discussion of what distinguishes ethical decision 
making on shale gas development by expanding upon four aspects of Cotton’s (2016) 
argument: (1) the role of compensation in distributive justice, (2) the definition of a 
‘community’, (3) the need for information provision, and (4) the best way to ensure 
procedural justice.  I have further introduced two issues with ethical relevance not discussed 
in Cotton’s work: (1) the role of shale gas development in a larger energy system and (2) the 
role of virtue in determining ethical policies.  Further discussion and analysis in this 
philosophically interesting and highly policy relevant area could move beyond consideration 
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of the dominant ethical frameworks considered to date (i.e., distributive and procedural 
justice and precautionary approaches).  A detailed consequentialist approach to evaluating 
shale gas development could be particularly useful due to the privileged place that 
consequentialist thinking often enjoys within policy processes; such analysis might move 
ethical thought one step closer to its necessary but neglected role in public policy and 
regulatory decision making on energy development (Evensen 2015, Hays and de Melo-
Martín 2014). 
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